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Cloud computing is clearly one of today’s most enticing 
technology areas due, at least in part, to its cost-efficiency and 
flexibility. However, despite the surge in activity and interest, 
there are significant, persistent concerns about cloud computing 
that are impeding momentum and will eventually compromise the 
vision of cloud computing as a new IT procurement model. In this 
paper, we characterize the problems and their impact on adoption. 
In addition, and equally importantly, we describe how the 
combination of existing research thrusts has the potential to 
alleviate many of the concerns impeding adoption. In particular, 
we argue that with continued research advances in trusted 
computing and computation-supporting encryption, life in the 
cloud can be advantageous from a business intelligence standpoint 
over the isolated alternative that is more common today. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: 
Security and Protection (D.4.6, K.4.2)  
General Terms 
Security, Standardization, Legal Aspects. 
Keywords 
Cloud computing, security, privacy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Today, the 14th largest software company by market capitalization 
(Salesforce.com) operates almost entirely in the cloud, the top five 
software companies by sales revenue all have major cloud 
offerings, and the market as a whole is predicted to grow to 
$160B by 2011 (source: Merrill Lynch). Yet, despite the 
trumpeted business and technical advantages of cloud computing, 
many potential cloud users have yet to join the cloud, and those 
major corporations that are cloud users are for the most part 
putting only their less sensitive data in the cloud. Lack of control 
in the cloud is the major worry. One aspect of control is 
transparency in the cloud implementation - somewhat contrary to 
the original promise of cloud computing in which the cloud 
implementation is not relevant. Transparency is needed for
regulatory reasons and to ease concern over the potential for data 
breaches. Because of today’s perceived lack of control, larger 
companies are testing the waters with smaller projects and less 
sensitive data. In short, the potential of the cloud is not being 
realized. 
 
When thinking about solutions to cloud computing’s adoption 
problem, it is important to realize that many of the issues are 
essentially old problems in a new setting, although they may be 
more acute. For example, corporate partnerships and offshore 
outsourcing involve similar trust and regulatory issues. Similarly, 
open source software enables IT departments to quickly build and 
deploy applications, but at the cost of control and governance. 
Finally, virtual machine attacks and Web service vulnerabilities 
existed long before cloud computing became fashionable. Indeed, 
this very overlap is reason for optimism; many of these “cloud 
problems” have long been studied and the foundations for 
solutions exist. 
 
In our vision, integrity of the cloud infrastructure is ensured 
through the use of Trusted Computing. In addition, we advocate 
the seamless extension of control from the enterprise into the 
cloud through the powerful combination of high-assurance remote 
server integrity, and cryptographic protocols supporting 
computation on ciphertext. With our approach, content is 
protected in a manner consistent with policies, whether in the 
enterprise or the cloud. Yet, because the protection mechanisms 
support computation, it is possible for all cloud participants to 
mutually benefit from the cloud data in a controlled manner. 
Hence, there are business intelligence advantages derived from 
operating in the cloud that simply don’t exist otherwise. We 
believe that the ability to get smarter through use of the cloud is 
the key differentiator that will sufficiently alleviate privacy fears 
to ensure widespread adoption. 
 
Organization. In Section 2, we give an overview of existing cloud 
computing concerns. We explore in more detail what the concerns 
of cloud users are, that is, what might be causing fear of the cloud. 
 
In Section 3 we describe new problem areas in security that we 
see arising from the trend towards cloud computing. We present 
evidence that these will become real problems after the maturation 
and more widespread adoption of cloud computing as a 
technology. 
 
Finally, in Section 4 we present our vision, some broad strategies 
that might be used to mitigate some of the concerns outlined in 
Sections 2 and 3.  
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies 
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, or 
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior 
specific permission and/or a fee. 
CCSW’09, November 13, 2009, Chicago, Illinois, USA. 
Copyright 2009 ACM  978-1-60558-784-4/09/11...$10.00. 
 
2. FEAR OF THE CLOUD 
What are the “security” concerns that are preventing companies 
from taking advantage of the cloud?  Numerous studies, for 
example IDC’s 2008 Cloud Services User Survey [29] of IT 
executives, cite security as the number one challenge for cloud 
users. 
In this section we present a taxonomy of the “security” concerns. 
The Cloud Security Alliance’s initial report [39] contains a 
different sort of taxonomy based on 15 different security domains 
and the processes that need to be followed in an overall cloud 
deployment. We categorize the security concerns as: 
 Traditional security 
 Availability 
 Third-party data control 
Traditional Security 
These concerns involve computer and network intrusions or 
attacks that will be made possible or at least easier by moving to 
the cloud. Cloud providers respond to these concerns by arguing 
that their security measures and processes are more mature and 
tested than those of the average company. Another argument, 
made by the Jericho Forum [16], is:  "It could be easier to lock 
down information if it's administered by a third party rather than 
in-house, if companies are worried about insider threats… In 
addition, it may be easier to enforce security via contracts with 
online services providers than via internal controls." 
 
Concerns in this category include: 
TS1. VM-level attacks. Potential vulnerabilities in the hypervisor 
or VM technology used by cloud vendors are a potential 
problem in multi-tenant architectures. Vulnerabilities have 
appeared in VMWare [48], Xen [51], and Microsoft’s Virtual 
PC and Virtual Server [47]. Vendors such as Third Brigade 
[46] mitigate potential VM-level vulnerabilities through 
monitoring and firewalls. 
TS2. Cloud provider vulnerabilities. These could be platform-
level, such as an SQL-injection or cross-site scripting 
vulnerability in salesforce.com. For instance, there have been 
a couple of recent Google Docs vulnerabilities [26] and [40]. 
The Google response to one of them is here: [27]. There is 
nothing new in the nature of these vulnerabilities; only their 
setting is novel. In fact, IBM has repositioned its Rational 
AppScan tool, which scans for vulnerabilities in web services 
as a cloud security service (see Blue Cloud Initiative [8]). 
TS3. Phishing cloud provider. Phishers and other social engineers 
have a new attack vector, as the Salesforce phishing incident 
[37] shows. 
TS4. Expanded network attack surface. The cloud user must 
protect the infrastructure used to connect and interact with 
the cloud, a task complicated by the cloud being outside the 
firewall in many cases. For instance, [38] shows an example 
of how the cloud might attack the machine connecting to it. 
TS5. Authentication and Authorization. The enterprise 
authentication and authorization framework does not 
naturally extend into the cloud. How does a company meld 
its existing framework to include cloud resources?  
Furthermore, how does an enterprise merge cloud security 
data (if even available) with its own security metrics and 
policies?  
TS6. Forensics in the cloud. This blog posting on the CLOIDIFIN 
[12] project summarizes the difficulty of cloud forensic 
investigations:  “Traditional digital forensic methodologies 
permit investigators to seize equipment and perform detailed 
analysis on the media and data recovered. The likelihood 
therefore, of the data being removed, overwritten, deleted or 
destroyed by the perpetrator in this case is low. More closely 
linked to a CC environment would be businesses that own 
and maintain their own multi-server type infrastructure, 
though this would be on a far smaller scale in comparison. 
However, the scale of the cloud and the rate at which data is 
overwritten is of concern.” 
Availability 
These concerns center on critical applications and data being 
available. Well-publicized incidents of cloud outages include 
Gmail (one-day outage in mid-October 2008 [20]), Amazon S3 
(over seven-hour downtime on July 20, 2008 [2]), and FlexiScale 
(18-hour outage on October 31, 2008 [22]).  
A1. Uptime. As with the Traditional Security concerns, cloud 
providers argue that their server uptime compares well with 
the availability of the cloud user’s own data centers. 
Besides just services and applications being down, this 
includes the concern that a third-party cloud would not scale 
well enough to handle certain applications. SAP’s CEO, Leo 
Apotheker said: “There are certain things that you cannot 
run in the cloud because the cloud would collapse…Don't 
believe that any utility company is going to run its billing for 
50 million consumers in the cloud.” (11/24/08, 
searchSAP.com) 
A2. Single point of failure. Cloud services are thought of as 
providing more availability, but perhaps not – there are more 
single points of failure and attack.  
A3. Assurance of computational integrity. Can an enterprise be 
assured that a cloud provider is faithfully running a hosted 
application and giving valid results?  For example, Stanford's 
Folding@Home project gives the same task to multiple 
clients to reach a consensus on the correct result. 
 
Third-party data control 
The legal implications of data and applications being held by a 
third party are complex and not well understood. There is also a 
potential lack of control and transparency when a third party holds 
the data. Part of the hype of cloud computing is that the cloud can 
be implementation independent, but in reality regulatory 
compliance requires transparency into the cloud. 
 
All this is prompting some companies to build private clouds to 
avoid these issues and yet retain some of the advantages of cloud 
 
computing. For example, Benjamin Linder, Scalent System’s 
CEO, says [15]: “What I find as CEO of a software company in 
this space, Scalent Systems, is that most enterprises have a hard 
time trusting external clouds for their proprietary and high-
availability systems. They are instead building internal "clouds", 
or "utilities" to serve their internal customers in a more controlled 
way.” 
BL1. Due diligence. If served a subpoena or other legal action, 
can a cloud user compel the cloud provider to respond in the 
required time-frame?  A related question is the provability of 
deletion, relevant to an enterprise’s retention policy:  How 
can a cloud user be guaranteed that data has been deleted by 
the cloud provider? 
BL2. Auditability. Audit difficulty is another side effect of the 
lack of control in the cloud. Is there sufficient transparency 
in the operations of the cloud provider for auditing purposes?  
Currently, this transparency is provided by documentation 
and manual audits. Information Security Magazine asks [28]: 
“How do you perform an on-site audit when you have a 
distributed and dynamic multi-tenant computing environment 
spread all over the globe?  It may be very difficult to satisfy 
auditors that your data is properly isolated and cannot be 
viewed by other customers.” 
       A related concern is proper governance of cloud-related 
activity. It’s easy, perhaps too easy, to start using a cloud 
service [44]. 
        
One popular auditing guideline is the SAS 70, which defines 
guidelines for auditors to assess internal controls, for 
instance controls over the processing of sensitive 
information. SOX and HIPAA are other well-known 
regulations. US government agencies generally need to 
follow guidelines from FISMA, NIST, and FIPS. 
 
Certain regulations require data and operations to remain in 
certain geographic locations. Cloud providers are beginning 
to respond with geo-targeted offerings [1]. 
BL3. Contractual obligations. One problem with using another 
company's infrastructure besides the uncertain alignment of 
interests is that there might be surprising legal implications. 
For instance, here is a passage from Amazon’s terms of use 
[3]: 
10.4. Non-Assertion. During and after the term of the 
Agreement, with respect to any of the Services that you elect 
to use, you will not assert, nor will you authorize, assist, or 
encourage any third party to assert, against us or any of our 
customers, end users, vendors, business partners (including 
third party sellers on websites operated by or on behalf of 
us), licensors, sublicensees or transferees, any patent 
infringement or other intellectual property infringement 
claim with respect to such Services.  
       This could be interpreted as implying that after you use EC2, 
you cannot file infringement claims against Amazon or its 
customers suggesting that EC2 itself violates any of your 
patents. It's not clear whether this non-assert would be upheld 
by the courts, but any uncertainty is bad for business. 
BL4. Cloud Provider Espionage. This is the worry of theft of 
company proprietary information by the cloud provider. For 
example, Google Gmail and Google Apps are examples of 
services supported by a private cloud infrastructure. 
Corporate users of these services are concerned about 
confidentiality and availability of their data. According to a 
CNN article [50]: 
For Shoukry Tiab, the vice president of IT at Jenny Craig, 
which uses Postini and Google Maps, the primary concern is 
security and confidentiality. "Am I nervous to host corporate 
information on someone else's server? Yes, even if it's 
Google." 
 
       Note that for consumers, there were initially widespread 
confidentiality concerns about Gmail (see [35]), but now 
those concerns seem to have faded. We believe this is an 
example of the Privacy Hump [18]: 
Early on in the life cycle of a technology, there are many 
concerns about how these technologies will be used. These 
concerns are lumped together forming a “privacy hump” 
that represents a barrier to the acceptance of a potentially 
intrusive technology…. Over time, however, the concerns 
fade, especially if the value proposition is strong enough. 
 
       Consumers at least seem to have decided that, in this case, the 
dangers of placing their data in the cloud were outweighed 
by the value they received. 
 
BL5. Data Lock-in. How does a cloud user avoid lock-in to a 
particular cloud-computing vendor?  The data might itself be 
locked in a proprietary format, and there are also issues with 
training and processes. There is also the problem of the cloud 
user having no control over frequent changes in cloud-based 
services (see [14]). Coghead [13] is one example of a cloud 
platform whose shutdown left customers scrambling to re-
write their applications to run on a different platform. Of 
course, one answer to lock-in is standardization, for instance 
GoGrid API [25]. 
 
BL6. Transitive nature. Another possible concern is that the 
contracted cloud provider might itself use subcontractors, 
over whom the cloud user has even less control, and who 
also must be trusted. One example is the online storage 
service called The Linkup, which in turn used an online 
storage company called Nirvanix. The Linkup shutdown after 
losing sizeable amounts of customer data, which some say 
was the fault of Nirvanix [32]. Another example is Carbonite 
[30], who is suing its hardware providers for faulty 
equipment causing loss of customer data.   
 
3. NEW PROBLEMS 
In this section we outline new problem areas in security that arise 
from cloud computing. These problems may only become 
apparent after the maturation and more widespread adoption of 
cloud computing as a technology. 
 
Cheap data and data analysis. The rise of cloud computing has 
created enormous data sets that can be monetized by applications 
such as advertising. Google, for instance, leverages its cloud 
infrastructure to collect and analyze consumer data for its 
advertising network. Collection and analysis of data is now 
 
possible cheaply, even for companies lacking Google’s resources. 
What is the impact on privacy of abundant data and cheap data-
mining?  Because of the cloud, attackers potentially have massive, 
centralized databases available for analysis and also the raw 
computing power to mine these databases. For example, Google is 
essentially doing cheap data mining when it returns search 
results. How much more privacy did one have before one could be 
Googled? 
 
Because of privacy concerns, enterprises running clouds 
collecting data have felt increasing pressure to anonymize their 
data. EPIC has called for Gmail, Google Docs, Google Calendar, 
and the company's other Web applications to be shut down until 
appropriate privacy guards are in place [23]. Google and Yahoo!, 
because of pressure from privacy advocates, now have an 18 
month retention policy for their search data, after which it will be 
anonymized. This means that some identifying data will be 
removed such as IP addresses and cookie information. The 
anonymized data is retained though, to support the continual 
testing of their algorithms. Another reason to anonymize data is to 
share data with other parties. These may be to support research 
(e.g., the AOL incident [5]) or to subcontract out data mining on 
the data (e.g., the Netflix data set [34]). 
 
We note that anonymizing data is a difficult problem. For 
example, in [33] the Netflix data set was partially de-anonymized, 
and in [45] the then-Governor of Massachusetts was identified as 
a patient of Massachusetts General Hospital from an anonymized 
list of discharged patients. Tools are needed for effective 
anonymization, which will increase in importance as clouds 
proliferate and more data is collected that needs to be analyzed 
safely or shared.  
 
An example of indirect data-mining that might be performed by a 
cloud provider is to note transactional and relationship 
information (see World Privacy Forum Report [36]). For example, 
the sharing of information by two companies may signal a merger 
is under consideration. 
Cost-effective defense of availability. Availability also needs to be 
considered in the context of an adversary whose goals are simply 
to sabotage activities. Increasingly, such adversaries are becoming 
realistic as political conflict is taken onto the web, and as the 
recent cyber attacks on Lithuania confirm [31]. The damages are 
not only related to the losses of productivity, but extend to losses 
due to the degraded trust in the infrastructure, and potentially 
costly backup measures. The cloud computing model encourages 
single points of failure. It is therefore important to develop 
methods for sustained availability (in the context of attack), and 
for recovery from attack. The latter could operate on the basis of 
minimization of losses, required service levels, or similar 
measures. 
Increased authentication demands. The development of cloud 
computing may, in the extreme, allow the use of thin clients on 
the client side. Rather than a license purchased and software 
installation on the client side, users will authenticate in order to be 
able to use a cloud application. There are some advantages in such 
a model, such as making software piracy more difficult and giving 
the ability to centralize monitoring. It also may help prevent the 
spread of sensitive data on untrustworthy clients. 
Thin clients result in a number of opportunities related to security, 
including the paradigm in which typical users do not have to 
worry about the risks of any actions – their security is managed by 
the cloud, which maintains the software they run. This 
architecture stimulates mobility of users, but increases the need to 
address authentication in a secure manner. In addition, the 
movement towards increased hosting of data and applications in 
the cloud and lesser reliance on specific user machines is likely to 
increase the threat of phishing and other abusive technologies 
aimed at stealing access credentials, or otherwise derive them, 
e.g., by brute force methods.  
Mash-up authorization. As adoption of cloud computing grows, 
we are likely to see more and more services performing mash-ups 
of data. This development has potential security implications, both 
in terms of data leaks, and in terms of the number of sources of 
data a user may have to pull data from – this, in turn, places 
requirements on how access is authorized for reasons of usability. 
While centralized access control may solve many of these 
problems, that may not be possible – or even desirable. 
One example in this area is provided by Facebook. Facebook 
users upload both sensitive and non-sensitive data. This data is 
both utilized by Facebook to present the data to other users, and 
also utilized by third party applications that are run by the 
platform. These applications are typically not verified by 
Facebook. Hence, there is a drive to create malicious applications 
that run in Facebook’s cloud to steal sensitive data, e.g., see [21]. 
4. NEW DIRECTIONS 
We now describe some elements of our vision. The core issue is 
that with the advent of the cloud, the cloud provider also has some 
control of the cloud users’ data. We aim to provide tools 
supporting the current capabilities of the cloud while limiting 
cloud provider control of data and enabling all cloud users to 
benefit from cloud data through enhanced business intelligence.  
Information-centric security 
In order for enterprises to extend control to data in the cloud, we 
propose shifting from protecting data from the outside (system 
and applications which use the data) to protecting data from 
within. We call this approach of data and information protecting 
itself information-centric (note that [4], [17], [19] use this 
terminology differently). This self-protection requires intelligence 
be put in the data itself. Data needs to be self-describing and 
defending, regardless of its environment. Data needs to be 
encrypted and packaged with a usage policy. When accessed, data 
should consult its policy and attempt to re-create a secure 
environment using virtualization and reveal itself only if the 
environment is verified as trustworthy (using Trusted Computing). 
Information-centric security is a natural extension of the trend 
toward finer, stronger, and more usable data protection. 
High-Assurance Remote Server Attestation 
We have noted that lack of transparency is discouraging 
businesses from moving their data to the cloud. Data owners wish 
to audit how their data is being handled at the cloud, and in 
particular, ensure that their data is not being abused or leaked, or 
at least have an unalterable audit trail when it does happen. 
 
Currently customers must be satisfied with cloud providers using 
manual auditing procedures like SAS-70. 
 
A promising approach to address this problem is based on Trusted 
Computing. Imagine a trusted monitor installed at the cloud server 
that can monitor or audit the operations of the cloud server. The 
trusted monitor can provide “proofs of compliance” to the data 
owner, stating that certain access policies have not been violated. 
To ensure integrity of the monitor, Trusted Computing also allows 
secure bootstrapping of this monitor to run beside (and securely 
isolated from) the operating system and applications. The monitor 
can enforce access control policies and perform 
monitoring/auditing tasks. To produce a “proof of compliance”, 
the code of the monitor is signed, as well as a “statement of 
compliance” produced by the monitor. When the data owner 
receives this proof of compliance, it can verify that the correct 
monitor code is run, and that the cloud server has complied with 
access control policies. 
Privacy-Enhanced Business Intelligence 
A different approach to retaining control of data is to require the 
encryption of all cloud data. The problem is that encryption limits 
data use. In particular searching and indexing the data becomes 
problematic. For example, if data is stored in clear-text, one can 
efficiently search for a document by specifying a keyword. This is 
impossible to do with traditional, randomized encryption schemes. 
State-of-the-art cryptography may offer new tools to solve these 
problems. Cryptographers have recently invented versatile 
encryption schemes that allow operation and computation on the 
ciphertext. For example, searchable encryption (also referred to as 
predicate encryption; see [43], [9], [42], [41], and [10]) allows the 
data owner to compute a capability from his secret key. A 
capability encodes a search query, and the cloud can use this 
capability to decide which documents match the search query, 
without learning any additional information. Other cryptographic 
primitives such as homomorphic encryption [24] and Private 
Information Retrieval (PIR) [11] perform computations on 
encrypted data without decrypting. As these cryptographic 
techniques mature, they may open up new possibilities for cloud 
computing security  
 
While in many cases more research is needed to make these 
cryptographic tools sufficiently practical for the cloud, we believe 
they present the best opportunity for a clear differentiator for 
cloud computing since these protocols can enable cloud users to 
benefit from one another’s data in a controlled manner. In 
particular, even encrypted data can enable anomaly detection that 
is valuable from a business intelligence standpoint. For example, a 
cloud payroll service might provide, with the agreement of 
participants, aggregate data about payroll execution time that 
allows users to identify inefficiencies in their own processes. 
Taking the vision even further, if the cloud service provider is 
empowered with some ability to search the encrypted data, the 
proliferation of cloud data can potentially enable better insider 
threat detection (e.g. by detecting user activities outside of the 
norm) and better data loss prevention (DLP) (e.g. through 
detecting anomalous content). 
 
Apart from ensuring privacy, applied cryptography may also offer 
tools to address other security problems related to cloud 
computing. For example, in proofs of retrievability (e.g., [7], [49]) 
the storage server can show a compact proof that it is correctly 
storing all of the client’s data. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Cloud computing is the most popular notion in IT today; even an 
academic report [6] from UC Berkeley says “Cloud Computing is 
likely to have the same impact on software that foundries have 
had on the hardware industry.”  They go on to recommend that 
“developers would be wise to design their next generation of 
systems to be deployed into Cloud Computing”. While many of 
the predictions may be cloud hype, we believe the new IT 
procurement model offered by cloud computing is here to stay. 
Whether adoption becomes as prevalent and deep as some 
forecast will depend largely on overcoming fears of the cloud. 
 
Cloud fears largely stem from the perceived loss of control of 
sensitive data. Current control measures do not adequately address 
cloud computing’s third-party data storage and processing needs. 
In our vision, we propose to extend control measures from the 
enterprise into the cloud through the use of Trusted Computing 
and applied cryptographic techniques. These measures should 
alleviate much of today’s fear of cloud computing, and, we 
believe, have the potential to provide demonstrable business 
intelligence advantages to cloud participation. 
 
Our vision also relates to likely problems and abuses arising from 
a greater reliance on cloud computing, and how to maintain 
security in the face of such attacks. Namely, the new threats 
require new constructions to maintain and improve security. 
Among these are tools to control and understand privacy leaks, 
perform authentication, and guarantee availability in the face of 
cloud denial-of-service attacks. 
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